A. 12. Computer Support for Analytic Functions

No problem faced by the Intelligence Community is of greater

technical complexity or has generated more institutional difficulties

than that of planning and applying computer and telecommunications

assets in support of intelligence functions, particularly the production

and presentation of intelligence end products.

During the past decade, Intelligence Community member organizations

have developed and installed large automated data handling systems to

store and retrieve intelligence materials in support of their own

organizations and missions. In spite of specific instructions to
                                                        (*)
the DCI from the National Security Council, and several inquiries by
                                                        (**)
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the forces

tending to maintain the individual autonomy of intelligence organiza-

tions have been more influential than the injunctions calling for

communitywide, coherent, comprehensive and interrelated information

handling capabilities.

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The past centrifugal tendencies of intelligence organizations with respect to information handling and telecommunications can be attributed to such factors as:

a. The lack of effective DCI influence on the separate program/budget activities of individual community components.

b. Reluctance on the part of senior levels of management to devote detailed attention to an arcane subject, in the management of which most had little or no professional familiarity. In competition with the intelligence substantive crises of the moment, intelligence managers tended to allow longer range ADP support problems to sink to the bottom of their in baskets -- particularly in the face of major cost implications.

A third reason for the failure of the Intelligence Community to provide for itself a well orchestrated, overall information handling plan and capstone system lies in the diffused character of intelligence functions. The major technical collection systems -- e.g., Imagery, COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry -- involved separate disciplines and grew separately, as did the data bases and the ADP systems that supported them. Within the Intelligence Community, data files were subject-oriented, and certain subjects tended to be the principal concern of certain agencies. Many files were heavily classified and compartmented. Files were built in the first instance to serve local analyst needs, and if a particular file became popular the sponsor informally agreed to allow a wider usage.

In the case of the CIA, practically no files escaped the confines of that agency to become more broadly accessible in the Community. The only major body of intelligence files consciously built and planned to be shared widely has been the corpus of imagery-related data. In this single case, the responsibility for file building and maintenance was planned and approved officially, and the Community has been guided for almost a decade by the national tasking plan for imagery.

Several factors have emerged recently which counteract, and may eventually overwhelm, the Community's separatist tendencies of the past. First, the volume of intelligence information is expanding, particularly as to [   ] Second, the   25X1 multi-dimensional character of the problems of national level policy makers requires a more sophisticated, interdisciplinary form of intelligence analysis. Third, the potential is increasing for the disruption of our society by way of increasing diverse pressures, tensions, and crises which can be caused by dissident groups -- all of which imposes the requirement for more rapid and sure-handed fusion and analysis of multi-source intelligence materials for high level consumers. Fourth, fiscal limitations on all intelligence agencies and on the national budget make it imperative that conscious choices be made with respect to the future automated capabilities that can be provided. Fifth, as a spur to change, the OMB and the Congress insist that the top management of the Intelligence Community take conscious and meaningful strides that will lead to a communitywide, interrelated and interacting system of information sharing that will

There is general recognition that this task of planning and seeing to the implementation -- necessarily, over an extended period of years -- of an overall, orchestrated total information system for the Intelligence Community and its customers can only be directed from the level of the Director of Central Intelligence. The current statement of the DCI's Perspectives advises:

> "Responsibility has been accepted at the Community level for sponsoring and producing medium- and long-range comprehensive plans on the subject of information handling. ... To accomplish these major tasks, there must be unstinting cooperation among all members of the Community. In addition to the Intelligence Community Staff and appropriate DCI Committees, the NFIB, the Intelligence Research and Development Council, and consultants will be involved, in order to provide guidance and carry on the detailed work of elaborating architecture and plans. The work will be subject to regular review at the highest levels, including the CFI (now PRC/I)."

In summary, the DCI has gone on record to the Community, the OMB, the Congress, and the Administration that he must and will attack this problem. Its scope is great. The follow-through that will be required to carry out the planning and to oversee the conduct of this work will be spread over a period of years. Resources of people and dollars that have not yet been made available will be required. It will be necessary to control our investment in the present while at the same time carrying out planning to capture the future, and to achieve this it will be necessary to meld and appraise short and longer range program decisions. There are no insolvable technical problems. Most of what will be required by way of automation is well within the state of the art and will be available from private industry's standard stock.

-4-

The *sine qua non* to the resolution of this immense and pressing
problem is the demonstrated willingness of top management of the
Community to commit the authority, the resources, and the continuing
top level attention that will be required.

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Remarks:

   Here is an unsolicited contribution which I
hope you can find a place for in PRM 11.

   I think the subject of Communitywide
Information Handling is important enough to
warrant mention herein. It consumes several
hundred millions of dollars yearly in the
budget, and it is in chaos.

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